




In the preface to U.S. Labor Law and the Future of Labor-
Management Cooperation, the U.S. Department of Labor defined the
purpose and scope of its study of legal impediments to labor-management
cooperation. It stated:
Potential conflict between current Federal labor laws and labor-management co-
operative efforts has led the U.S. Department of Labor to embark on a study, using
its own resources and inviting the assistance of outside experts, to review the nation's
labor laws and collective bargaining traditions and practices that may inhibit improved
labor-management relations. The study is designed to assess whether the existing
framework impedes, or, indeed, totally bars, many of the cooperative efforts the
Department is encouraging and publicizing; and, if so, whether, through interpretation
or modification, the laws can be made to support both the ingredients and the goals
of labor-management cooperation rather than conflict with them.'
An examination of the labor laws, collective bargaining traditions, and
practices in state and local government is necessary to accomplish these
stated objectives. While analogous to the private sector framework in
many respects, the public sector has evolved its unique labor laws and
collective bargaining traditions. These laws and traditions vary with
each jurisdiction. Moreover, civil service laws and other regulations add
a dimension to the public sector framework that warrants independent
examination. In addition, state and local government employers and
unions have become increasingly interested in cooperative approaches
to labor-management relations. Indeed, eighteen major national-level
public employer and union organizations concerned with labor-manage-
* This research was conducted under a cooperative agreement between the U.S.
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor-Management Relations and Cooperative Programs,
and the University of Florida College of Law, with Professor Robert B. Moberly serving
as Principal Investigator. The views expressed in this Report do not necessarily represent
the official position or policy of the Department of Labor.
** Professor of Law, University of Florida. B.S. 1963; J.D. 1966, University of
Wisconsin. The author wishes to express appreciation to Mr. Paul Healy and Ms. Maria
Korn, law students at the University of Florida, for their research assistance on this
project.-Ed.
1. See generally BUREAU OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AND COOPERATIVE
PROGRAMS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, U.S. LABOR LAW AND THE FUTURE OF LABOR-
MANAGEMENT COOPERATION (BLMR 104, 1988). See also BUREAU OF LABOR-MAN-
AGEMENT RELATIONS AND COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, FIRST
INTERIM REPORT (BLMR 113, 1987) on the same subject, as well as Schlossberg &
Fetter, U.S. Labor Law and the Future of Labor-Management Cooperation, 37 LAB. L.J.
595 (1986).
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ment relations in state and local government, in cooperation with the
U.S. Department of Labor and the Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Service, have joined together in the formation of the State and Local
Government Labor-Management Committee. 2 This committee, from its
initial meeting in December 1985, has committed itself to the promotion
of cooperation between labor and management. Seven states which have
significant collective bargaining legislation have been selected for the
committee's initial outreach efforts? The committee is working with its
constituent organizations in each state to develop a statewide effort to
encourage and assist in the development and implementation of coop-
erative labor-management efforts. In a statement of purpose and objec-
tives, 4 the committee members "agree to promote labor-management
cooperation in state and local governments," and further "agree that
labor-management cooperation offers the potential for increased worker
satisfaction, higher productivity, and more effective service to the public."
The organizations recognize that "involvement of employees in the
decisions that affect them can do much to improve the quality of the
decisions made, the fairness, both real and perceived, of these decisions,
and the workers' sense of contribution to the organization."
The American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees
(AFSCME) has resolved to "support the use of joint Labor-Management
Committees," so long as there are appropriate safeguards for the Union,
including the following:
(1). The initial establishment of the committee should be for a specified
period of time during which the work of the committee should be evaluated
in accord with a built-in review process to determine its usefulness;
(2). The appointment of people to the committee who are responsible for
bargaining and administering the collective bargaining agreement, thus
adding knowledge, respect and power to the process; and,
(3). An initial agreement that the committee is not a substitute for collective
bargaining, and agreements arising out of the committee are advisory for
2. Public employer organizations represented are as follows: Council of State Gov-
ernments; International City Management Association; National Association of Counties;
National Governors Association; National League of Cities; National Public Employer
Labor Relations Association; National School Boards Association; and U.S. Conference
of Mayors.
Union organizations represented are as follows: AFL-CIO Public Employee Depart-
ment; American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees; American Fed-
eration of Teachers; Communication Workers of America; International Association of
Fire Fighters; International Federation of Professional and Technical Engineers; Interna-
tional Union of Operating Engineers; International Union of Police Associations; Labor's
International Union of North America; and Service Employees International Union.
3. The states are Connecticut, Florida, Massachusetts, Michigan, Rhode Island,
Washington, and Wisconsin.
4. State and Local Government Labor-Management Committee, Statement of Purpose




the initial period and cannot automatically supersede the collective bar-
gaining agreements.'
The President of AFSCME has further stated, "there is really no
alternative in our relationships with one another except labor-manage-
ment cooperation."'6 He stated that governments and public sector unions
"have the joint responsibility for making government work the best we
can under very difficult circumstances.
7
There seem to be several reasons why public employers and unions
are looking for cooperative approaches. First, there is a recognition that
productivity improvements and cost savings are important to the amount
of funding available for other governmental purposes, including wages
and fringe benefits. With many governments facing stout resistance to
added taxation, the parties recognize that efficiency is an important
variable in providing a fair compensation arrangement. Employers and
unions are looking for ways to improve productivity and the quality of
service, while at the same time improving conditions of work. Second,
the work force is better educated than ever, and the parties have
attempted to focus on how this greater education, ability and experience
can best be utilized to improve the prospects of success for the gov-
ernmental employer, the workforce, and the general public. Finally, in
the last few years there has been a greater recognition of the importance
of providing a humane working environment in which employees achieve
greater work satisfaction and, therefore, life satisfaction from their jobs.
II. VARIETIES OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT COOPERATION PROGRAMS
IN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
State and local governments have adopted a variety of labor-man-
agement cooperation programs, as will now be discussed.
A. State Government
The State of New York has been a leader in establishing labor-
management cooperation programs. Some programs seem to stem from
the 1976 fiscal crisis in the state. Over the years, numerous labor-
management committees have been established between the State of
New York and its unions dealing with issues such as child care, health
care, continuity of employment, work force planning, problems sur-
rounding prisons, and many others. Both employer and union represen-
5. Text of Selected Resolutions Adopted by AFSCME Delegates, 970 Gov't Empl.
Rel. Rep. (BNA) 57 (July 12, 1982).
6. NPELRA Conference Discusses Common Concerns of Labor and Management,
22 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 566 (Mar. 19, 1984).
7. Id.
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tatives regularly comment that these kinds of cooperative efforts make
good sense.' For example, in 1979, a child care program was established
in which the state set aside fifty thousand dollars, and labor-management
committees met to work out a program for specific places. Now grants
amount to twenty thousand dollars per center for the first year of
operation, and there are twenty-five on-site centers throughout the state.
.According to the chief union representative, the feedback from the
program has been very positive, and has led to improved morale and
reduced absenteeism. 9
The parties have also cooperated in the area of employee assistance
programs (EAP) for substance abuse. EAP is called "the most successful
project to date in reaching out to local membership" and is "joint in
every sense of the word." Over two hundred joint programs are in place
throughout the state.10
Health care cost containment also has proved a viable source for
labor-management cooperation in New York. The state and its unions
worked together to develop a sweeping new health plan to take effect
in 1986; it is predicted to cut health insurance costs by one hundred
and fifty million dollars over three years. At a recent conference, both
labor and management representatives indicated they had no choice but
to cooperate because of their mutual interest in keeping insurance costs
down."
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts is also making extensive use
of labor-management committees. Governor Michael Dukakis has been
emphasizing labor-management cooperation since taking office in early
1983.12 Recent collective bargaining agreements include more than fifty
joint labor-management committees, which address such issues as con-
tracting out, training and career ladders, health and safety, child care,
performance evaluation and employee participation. 3 A special com-
mission on employee involvement has recommended that the state pro-
mote employee involvement in the public sector by further expanding
and promoting employee involvement within state government; in cities
and towns, through grants, sharing of information and resources, and
support and monitoring; in schools and institutions of higher education
8. QWL Programs in New York Discussed by Panelists, 24 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep.
(BNA) 786 (June 2, 1986).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Joint Cooperation Held Key to Controlling Costs, 25 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep.
(BNA) 826 (June 8, 1987).
12. Testimony of Daniel J. Sullivan, Director of the Office of Employee Relations,
and Susan B. Levine, Coordinator of Statewide Quality of Work Life Programs, before





through grants and, interestingly, by adding employee representatives
to the Boards of Trustees of higher education institutions, as well as
the Board of Regents and school committees.'
In 1984, the first contract ever negotiated for a group of state
employees in Ohio called for the formation of Labor-Management Com-
mittees, to discuss staffing patterns, health and safety, security, dress
codes and other issues of mutual concern. 5
A Wisconsin report recently recommended further labor management
cooperation among state government employees and other public sector
workers, stating:
The state as an employer can set an example for all public sector
organizations by implementing labor-management cooperation processes within
state agencies and departments. Already there are state government labor-
management committees that are functioning effectively-notably within
the Wisconsin Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations and
the Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services. The Departments
of Revenue and Employment Relations have also initiated quality improve-
ment programs and participative management processes. 6
The recommendation called labor-management cooperation an "impor-
tant approach" for dealing with such problems as opening communi-
cation, eliminating red tape and layers of bureaucracy, improving cost
effectiveness, and fully harnessing the skills of a diverse work force.17
Other states which have recently negotiated contracts calling for labor-
management committees include Connecticut" and Iowa.'9 The Iowa
provision is somewhat unique. It provides that recommendations of the
committee involving health and safety items not acted on and that are
non-economic may be submitted to binding arbitration, presumably under
the state's binding arbitration law.
B. Local Government
Cities and unions across the land, from New York, New York, to
14. SPECIAL COMMISSION ON EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT AND OWNERSHIP, MAKING
A DIFFERENCE: EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT AND OWNERSHIP IN MASSACHUSETrS V-Vi
(June 1, 1987) (draft report).
15. First Contract Betweeen Ohio and UFCW Raises Liquor Clerk Pay 18% Over
Term, 24 Gov't EmpI. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 537 (Apr. 21, 1986). The contract is between
the State of Ohio and the United Food and Commerical Workers (UFCW), covering
1,228 Ohio State Liquor Store clerks and lottery sales representatives. Id.
16. WISCONSIN DEPARTMENT OF DEVELOPMENT, LABOR-MANAGEMENT COOPERA-
TION IN WISCONSIN 56 (1987).
17. Id.
18. Agreement Between State of Connecticut and Health Care Employees, 22 Gov't
Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 1116 (June 4, 1984).
19. Agreement Between State of Iowa and AFSCME, 22 Gov't EmpI. Rel. Rep.
(BNA) 369 (Feb. 20, 1984).
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Kalamazoo, Michigan, 20 to Phoenix, Arizona,2' to San Diego, California,
are establishing labor-management cooperation programs. A recent report
indicated that the San Diego Fire Department has adopted a participatory
style of management, pushing decision making to the lowest possible
level, and setting up problem-solving groups led by rank-and-file fire
fighters. Through this process it has saved over $367,000 and has handled
four times as many fires, emergencies, and other community services
without an increase in personnel. Both Union and management repre-
sentatives highly praise the new arrangements.'
New York City has an active program of labor-management com-
mittees. "By 1986, about 1200 managers and union workers representing
75,000 employees in twelve different agencies were active participants
in [more than 150] labor-management committees."" Eight unions par-
ticipate.' The principles of the New York City program are as follows:
(1). Each committee must have a formal, jointly agreed upon structure
that identifies the membership and scope of activities. A committee's first
action should be to define its own procedures.
(2). Decisions should be reached through consensus, rather than by voting.
(3). Committees should be co-chaired by labor and management represen-
tatives (joint chairing of a single meeting, not alternative chairs).
(4). Management's co-chairperson should be in a position of sufficient
operational authority to commit resources required to effect the solution of
problems.
(5). Management responsibility should rest with a position rather than with
an individual in order to ensure continuity in the event of turnover.
(6). Each committee should have high visibility throughout its unit, bureau,
or agency.
(7). Committees and subcommittees should meet regularly, at least on a
monthly basis.
(8). Membership in the LMC should be open to all unions in an agency,
although participation should be voluntary.
(9). Unions should be responsible for selecting their own representatives.
20. Agreement Between Kalamazoo, Michigan and AFSCME, 21 Gov't Empl. Rel.
Rep. (BNA) 1115 (May 23, 1983).
21. Agreement Between Phoenix, Ariz., and Phoenix Law Enforcement Ass'n, 22 Gov't
Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 95 (Jan. 9, 1984).
22. Worker Participation Improves Morale, Productivity of San Diego Firefighters,
25 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 966-67 (July 13, 1987).
23. OFFICE OF THE MAYOR AND THE MUNICIPAL LABOR COMMITTEE, LABOR-MAN-
AGEMENT COOPERATION AND QUALITY OF WORK LIFE IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK 6
(1987).
24. Id. at 22.
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(10). Committees should avoid discussing matters which are the subjects
of collective bargaining or grievances.5
With respect to the New York City Program an outsider observed the
following:
Among the issues that have been considered by participants are alternate
work schedules (compressed work weeks, staggered or flexible working
hours), which have proven effective in reducing absenteeism; employee
recognition programs; work site improvement projects, which deal with
factors other than safety, designed to improve productivity; and employee
assistance programs.
Among the major achievements of the program ... is a new citywide
approach to computerizing payroll records, which has generated useful
employment data and has reduced grievances over pay issues; the devel-
opment of standards to govern subcontracting; and the creation of a health
and accident information system to keep track of accidents and injuries on
the job. Extensive training has also been conducted for employees.6
As one example of the many successes of such committees, city and
union representatives reported that a committee implemented in the
Sanitation Department produced changes in its first two years which
permitted the Department to save about sixteen million dollars.27
The system is also being used in education. The Chicago Board of
Education and the Chicago Teachers Union agreed to form a joint labor-
management committee to consider educational reform issues, including
teacher certification, preparation and recruitment; student expectations
and effectiveness; teacher effectiveness, performance and evaluation; and
the certification and training of school administrators.2
C. Role of Labor Relations Agencies
There is a role for state labor relations agencies in encouraging labor-
management committees or other forms of cooperation in state and local
government. In New York, the New York Public Employee Relations
25. Id. at 8.
26. C. GOLD, LABOR-MANAGEMENT COMMITTEES: CONFRONTATION, COOPTATION,
OR COOPERATION? 39 (1986).
27. Improved Productivity Attributed to Labor-Management Committee, 24 Gov't
Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 785 (June 2, 1986). See also Work Worth Doing, (U.S. Dept.
of Lab. Bureau of Labor-Management Relations and Cooperative Programs video docu-
mentary). This documentary includes the New York City Sanitation Department as one
of its examples of the success of labor-management cooperation.
28. Alternative Health Care Terms Accepted by Unions in Chicago, 22 Gov't EmpI.
Rel. Rep. (BNA) 2339 (Dec. 31, 1984). The Labor-Management Committee remains
intact following the 1987 strike. The committee continues to meet monthly, and "the
strike did not affect the labor-management committee at all." Telephone interview with
Chuck Burdeen, Communications Director, Chicago Teachers Union (Dec. 16, 1987).
Other cooperative programs in education are discussed in AFT Leader Says Cooperation
Produces Fewer Fall Walkouts, 25 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 1276-77 (Sept. 14,
1987).
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Board (PERB) has been instrumental in establishing many labor-man-
agement committees in local government. Under the direction of Chair-
man Harold Newman, the New York Board in 1984 established a
program promoting labor-management committees at the local govern-
ment level. The program provides start-up money and a PERB facilitator
for committees at the local government level. According to Chairman
Newman, PERB received an "astounding" response across New York
State to this program.29 In 1986-87, the New York PERB continued its
aggressive initiative to encourage the development of labor-management
committees in local governments and school districts throughout the
state. The program.., has provided the parties with staff and panel
facilitators and trainers, knowledgeable in the concepts of labor-man-
agement cooperation.30
The PERB program developed fourteen labor-management committees
(LMC) in 1986-87, thirty-nine from 1984-87, and has a goal of twenty-
five in 1987-88. 11 PERB also helped the parties maintain established
labor-management committees by sponsoring conferences and conducting
workshops and training programs to enhance skills of joint committee
members in problem solving, decision-making and consensus building. 2
For the future, PERB expressed "a firm intention to continue support
of the LMC program," calling it "an integral part of PERB's mission
which is expected to have continued growth."33
The Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission (WERC) has also
assisted in the development of labor-management cooperation. A recent
report noted, "[i]n the past few years, WERC has provided information
and assistance to workers and managers who are establishing labor-
management cooperation arrangements. Most notably, in 1984 WERC
commissioners participated as neutral parties in the formation of the
Milwaukee Area Public Sector Labor-Management Council. '",
The report further noted a limitation seemingly common to labor
relations agencies, that WERC "does not have funding to provide seed
money for support of labor-management cooperation programs nor does
it have a mandate to provide staff dedicated to developing a statewide
program.35 The report recommended that WERC participate in a "net-
work of labor-management technical assistance providers" which would
29. Joint Labor Management Committees Should Not Have Preconditions, PERB
Conference Told, 23 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 751 (May 20, 1985).
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"collaborate on educational activities, on research and on providing
assistance to local labor-management efforts."3
Also, the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) has
assisted state and local labor-management cooperative efforts, pursuant
to the Labor-Management Cooperation Act of 1978.11 In October 1987,
the FMCS awarded "one million dollars in grants to support the operation
of sixteen joint labor-management committees throughout the United
States, including funding for three public sector projects."38
D. Summary
Labor-management cooperation programs have proved their worth for
scores of public employers and unions, and for thousands of public
employees across the country as well as the general public. The success
of labor-management programs has been such that they cannot be
dismissed as "gimmickry," even though further study would help in
determining the most effective methods of creating, implementing and
maintaining such programs. Labor relations agencies can play an im-
portant role in encouraging cooperation, especially when specific funding
is provided for this purpose.
III. LEGAL IMPEDIMENTS TO LABOR-MANAGEMENT COOPERATION
IN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Labor-management programs have proved their worth in many areas.
However, questions exist as to whether there are legal impediments to
creation or implementation of such programs.
A. General
The reported labor-management cooperation programs appear almost
exclusively in those jurisdictions which have comprehensive bargaining
36. Id. at 54. Developments in Wisconsin were discussed at a workshop entitled "Labor-
Management Cooperation in the Public Sector," conducted as part of a "Wisconsin
Conference on Labor-Management Cooperation" conducted on April 3, 1987, in Milwaukee,
Wisconsin. (Audiotapes and handouts are on file at the University of Florida College of
Law and are available through the Wisconsin Department of Development).
37. 29 U.S.C. § 175(a) (1982).
38. FMCS Awards $1 Million in Grants to Aid Labor Management Committees, 25
Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 1497 (Oct. 26, 1987). The grants, awarded under the
FMCS Labor-Management Cooperation Program, went both to new committees seeking
federal assistance to help them get started and to older projects expanding into new areas.
The three public-sector projects involved a hospital and several different hospital unions,
the development of an employee assistance program and dispute resolution project in a
city, and a labor-management project in a school system. The FMCS awarded its first
Cooperation Program grants in fiscal year 1981, and has since funded eighty-nine labor-
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laws, which now include about twenty-seven states and the District of
Columbia. 9 It is reasonable to conclude that the creation and mainte-
nance of such programs requires the existence of supportive legislation
which encourages or requires collective bargaining. To the extent that
the remaining states do not have such legislation, this gap obviously
impedes the development of labor-management cooperation programs.
Legal impediments exist, however, even in those states which have
created a general right of collective bargaining.
B. Scope of Bargaining
One example of a legal impediment to labor-management cooperation
is the limited scope of bargaining allowed by some states. While some
states have adopted the private sector standard, requiring bargaining
over "wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment,"
4
others have adopted a more restricted standard, either by legislation or
judicial decision. A restricted standard may be imposed by only allowing
bargaining on specific enumerated topics41 or by legislation which con-
tains a "management rights" clause which limits the scope of bargaining
by explicitly reserving certain broad prerogatives to the employer.42 Both
management committees covering about four million employees represented by more than
thirty national unions. Id.
39. The states are set forth in AFL-CIO Public Employee Department Report Says
Half of State and Local Employees Have No Bargaining Rights, 25 Gov't Empl. Rel.
Rep. (BNA) 407 (Mar. 23, 1987) (full statutory citations are set forth in Comment, The
Public Employee Labor Law in Missouri, 51 Mo. L. REv. 715, 740-41 n.194 (1986)).
Such laws normally protect the right to organize of most public employees, establish a
duty to bargain collectively, create an impasse resolution procedure, and provide for a
labor agency to administer the law.
This study focused primarily on labor-management cooperation programs agreed to
between governmental bodies and employee representatives. It does not appear from the
literature or labor relations reporters that cooperative programs or other employee in-
volvement mechanisms such as quality circles, gainsharing, and the like, are prevalent in
non-union settings in state or local government, regardless of the presence or absence of
a collective bargaining law.
40. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982). For state examples of scope-of-bargaining provisions
similar to the federal standard, see, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 447.309 (1981 & Supp. 1988);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.215 (West 1978). For discussions of some limitations
existing even under the federal standard, see Moberly, New Directions in Worker Par-
ticipation and Collective Bargaining, 87 W. VA. L. REV. 765, 782-84 (1985), and Labor
Department reports, supra note 1.
41. E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4327(b) (1984) which provides that the parties shall
meet and confer in the determination of conditions of employment, which are defined in
§ 75-4322(t) to include "salaries, wages, hours of work, vacation allowances, sick and
injury leave, number of holidays, retirement benefits, insurance benefits, prepaid legal
service benefits, wearing apparel, premium pay for overtime, shift differential pay, jury
duty, and grievance procedures." Id.
42. For example, the Iowa Statute provides:
Public employers shall have, in addition to all powers, duties, and rights established
by constitutional provision statute, ordinance, charter, or special act, the exclusive
power, duty, and the right to:
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restrictions attempt to preserve the unilateral right of the employer to
act in a wide number of areas which are otherwise commonly bargained
about in both the public and private sectors, and which are also commonly
dealt with by labor-management committees as described in Part I.
Some state courts have contributed to limiting the scope of bargaining
by narrowly interpreting "conditions of employment" provisions or broadly
construing statutory "management rights" provisions. For example, a
New Jersey court held that when an issue primarily concerns a man-
agerial prerogative, it is not negotiable even if it "may ultimately affect"
working conditions.43 A Pennsylvania court gave priority to the statute's
management rights provision over the scope of bargaining provision and
removed twenty-one commonly-negotiated items from the list of bar-
gainable topics." A Harvard Law Review study noted:
The judiciary's adherence to strict notions of managerial prerogative
contravenes the legislative mandate underlying public sector bargaining
statutes. Such statutes clearly represent at least a partial repudiation of
the sanctity of the government employer's unilateral decision making power.
Further, they reflect the underlying legislative judgment that labor peace-
and therefore governmental efficiency-is best promoted by an effective
collective bargaining system. By unduly deferring to managerial prerogative,
courts may thwart the fulfillment of the legislative policy underlying the
adoption of collective bargaining. When issues of fundamental concern to
employees are removed from bargaining, labor strife becomes more likely;
the consequent disruption of government operations subverts the very ad-
ministrative efficiency that the management-rights limitation is aimed at
protecting.'5
It appears that labor-management cooperation programs are more
extensive in states which have a broader definition of subjects of
I. Direct the work of its public employees.
2. Hire, promote, demote, transfer, assign, and retain public employees in positions
within the public agency.
3. Suspend or discharge public employees for proper cause.
4. Maintain the efficiency of governmental operations.
5. Relieve public employees from duties because of lack of work or for other
legitimate reasons.
6. Determine and implement methods, means, assignments and personnel by which
the public employer's operations are to be conducted.
7. Take such actions as may be necessary to carry out the mission of the public
employer.
8. Initiate, prepare, certify, and administer its budget.
9. Exercise all powers and duties granted to the public employer by law.
IOvA CODE § 20.7 (1987).
43. Teaneck Bd. of Educ. v. Teaneck Teachers Ass'n, 94 N.J. 9, 14-16, 462 A.2d
137, 140-41 (1983).
44. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. v. State College Area School Dist., 9 Pa. Commw.
229, 306 A.2d 404 (1973).
45. Developments in the Law-Public Employment, 97 HARv. L. REV. 1611, 1690
(1984).
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bargaining, such as New York and Massachusetts. It seems likely that
undue restrictions on the scope of bargaining discourage labor-manage-
ment cooperation and reduce the effectiveness of the entire statute as
a dispute settlement mechanism designed to encourage cooperation. As
noted by the Harvard Law Review study cited above:
Legislatures and courts have developed a subjects-of-bargaining doctrine
that unduly emphasizes the government's interest in preserving its traditional
authority to make unilateral decisions on matters of public employment.
Current limitations on the scope of bargaining both unnecessarily devalue
the rights of public employees and undercut the public's interest in reducing
labor strife through an effective system of labor relations.'
C. Civil Service
A further impediment to labor-management cooperation may exist if
overbroad civil service laws cover subjects which commonly are included
in labor-management cooperation programs, such as employee training,
job safety, attendance control, and other important areas of concern to
the parties. In the event of a conflict between a civil service provision,
usually established unilaterally, and a provision established by mutual
agreement under a labor-management cooperation program or as part
of a collective bargaining agreement, which would prevail? Some states
provide that civil service laws or pre-existing laws take precedence over
other laws.4' Other states provide that the labor relations act or collective
bargaining agreements take precedence over conflicting statutes.48 A
third alternative, utilized all too often, is for the legislature to ignore
the problem altogether when it establishes the labor relations statute,
thus deferring to the courts on the question of which law the legislature
intended to be superior. 9
The courts have varied considerably in determining whether mutual
agreements or civil service provisions should prevail. One approach,
adopted in Delaware, is to resolve any doubt in favor of the merit
system.' The Iowa Supreme Court refused to enforce a contractual
arbitration procedure for terminations, stating that terminations may be
reviewed solely and exclusively through civil service appeal procedures.5
46. Id. at 1683-84.
47. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 4013 (1981).
48. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-474(f) (West 1972). This approach was
recommended in CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY ADVISORY COUNCIL, FINAL REPORT OF AS-
SEMBLY ADVISORY COUNCIL ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS 175 (1973). See also
Helburn & Bennett, Public Employee Bargaining and the Merit Principle, 23 LAB. L.J.
618 (1972); Comment, The Civil Service-Collective Bargaining Conflict in the Public
Sector: Attempts at Reconciliation, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 826 (1971).
49. E.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.201-.216 (West Supp. 1988).
50. Laborers' Int'l Union, Local 1029 v. State, 310 A.2d 664, 667 (Del. Ch. 1973),
aff 'd per curiam, 314 A.2d 919 (Del. 1974).
51. Devine v. City of Des Moines, 366 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Iowa 1985).
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In a Florida case, local civil service rules concerning holidays, funeral
leave, seniority, and layoffs were held to prevail over negotiated collective
bargaining provisions on those same subjects.5 2 Such holdings necessarily
have the effect of stifling, if not precluding, joint cooperative efforts
to resolve issues of mutual concern.
A better approach has been developed by the Supreme Court of
Michigan, as illustrated in the case of Local 1383, Int'l Ass'n of Fire
Fighters v. City of Warren.3 The City of Warren had a civil service
merit promotional system for fire fighters and police officers, as au-
thorized by state law. The City and Local 1383, representing Warren
fire fighters, executed a collective bargaining agreement creating an
exception to the civil service law. Promotions would be based on "sen-
iority and reasonable qualifications as may be determined by the Fire
Department after consultation with the Union." Subsequently, the Fire
Commissioner informed the Civil Service Commission that, pursuant to
the collective bargaining agreement, the Fire Department was in the
process of qualifying persons for promotions and would submit a list of
names from which the department would make promotions. The Civil
Service Commission took the position that it was the body which
determined qualifications for promotion under the civil service law.
The Michigan Supreme Court nicely posed the issue in the following
way:
The question presented is whether a collective bargaining agreement's
provision concerning promotions, which is entered into under the Public
Employment Relations Act (PERA), is valid and enforceable when it
conflicts with provisions of a city charter and the fire and police civil
service act ....
The court believed the critical question was "whether a normal and
vital subject of bargaining can be removed from the public bargaining
table by local charter provisions."55 The court found it could not, holding
the contract provision governing promotions valid and enforceable, not-
withstanding conflicting provisions in the civil service law. The court
concluded that collective negotiation was the proper procedure for
determining employment conditions, and that the civil service law neither
addressed nor focused upon a collective negotiation method. The court
stated:
We are satisfied that the local civil service section of the Constitution
was not intended to preclude the Legislature from enacting PERA to provide
for free and full local collective bargaining, including the vital concerns of
promotions and seniority. If this were not the case, PERA, a uniform state-
52. Hillsborough County Aviation Auth. v. County Gov't Employees Ass'n, 482 So.
2d 505 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
53. 411 Mich. 642, 311 N.W.2d 702 (1981).
54. Id. at 649, 311 N.W.2d at 703.
55. Id. at 651, 311 N.W.2d at 704.
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wide law, would be converted into a local-option law. Each locality would
cut a wide swath in determining what would be a subject of bargaining in
the heart of the bargaining process. In place of the specific exemption of
only one group of public employees, the state classified civil service,
numerous local public employers would be allowed to opt out of the scheme
promulgated by PERA for the resolution of disputes involving mandatory
subjects of bargaining, such as promotions and seniority. This would severely
erode the sound policies which have led this Court to conclude that PERA
and its constitutional source should be the dominant authority governing
disputes concerning public employees. 6
Similarly, the Florida Supreme Court has stated the issue as "whether
a city which has established provisions for demotion and discharge of
police officers in its civil service ordinance is required to bargain
collectively on those issues to the extent of establishing, and being
subject to, alternate grievance procedures. 7 The court held in the
affirmative, stating, "while the city has the authority to enact civil
service ordinances, state statutes will take precedence over such ordi-
nances where specific conflicts arise."58
Clearly, those laws and judicial decisions which hold the collective
bargaining process to have primacy over unilateral civil service systems
will provide greater encouragement for the parties to enter into labor-
management cooperation programs, which almost always are mutually
determined. To the extent that a civil service system preempts subjects
of labor-management programs, those programs will suffer or be non-
existent. The difference between collective bargaining systems and civil
service systems was explained by the Florida Public Employee Relations
Commission, in concluding that the collective bargaining process should
prevail over civil service systems, in determining conditions of employ-
ment. It stated:
This conclusion is consistent with certain basic differences between tra-
ditional notions of civil service laws and collective bargaining laws. Although
both types of legislation have similar ultimate goals-i.e., the improvement
of the working conditions of the employees-the vehicles by which these
similar goals are sought to be accomplished are very different. The differ-
ences stem largely from differences in the social philosophies which underlie
each system. The philosophy behind the usual civil service law is that the
government employer should, for a number of reasons, unilaterally determine
what is good for its employees without employee participation in the decision-
making process. The philosophy behind the usual collective bargaining law
is quite different-it is founded on the notion that the employees at least
know what they want (if not what is good for them) and that where there
are options from which to choose the employees should be given a meaningful
voice in the process of determining their own terms and conditions of
employment.
56. Id. at 667, 311 N.W.2d at 711.
57. City of Casselberry v. Orange County Police, 482 So. 2d 336, 337 (Fla. 1986).
58. Id. at 339.
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The incompatibility of these two underlying philosophies is largely the
reason for the frequent incompatibility of simultaneous operation of civil
service systems and collective bargaining systems. While the two may abut
each other, they generally will not successfully dovetail together. Rather,
to the extent the two systems begin to overlap, one must take precedence
over the other, and it appears that the people of the State of Florida
through their adoption of the constitutional provisions discussed above and
the Legislature of Florida through its adoption of Section 447.601, Florida
Statutes (1979), have decided that such overlaps should be resolved in favor
of collective bargaining. 9
The Florida PERC was affirmed on appeal. The court noted that a
contrary argument "overlooks the underlying reality that the School
Board and its represented employees can never enter into a collective
bargaining agreement which contains any provision of which the Civil
Service Board disapproves"' 6 and that such a view would "operate as
a wholesale impediment to collective bargaining."" Accordingly, the
court concluded that the collective bargaining law prevailed over the
civil service provisions.' 2 This sort of construction is most consistent with
the goal of encouraging labor-management cooperation and removing
impediments.
D. Yeshiva in the Public Sector
In U.S. Labor Law and the Future of Labor-Management Cooper-
ation,63 NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ." was sharply criticized. In that case,
the U.S. Supreme Court held that faculty members were substantially
operating Yeshiva University and were therefore managerial employees
who could be denied collective bargaining rights under the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended. The Labor Department report crit-
icized Yeshiva because it "jeopardized the desired method of operation
in an ideal employee/employer participation plan, and, if extended,
could potentially cast doubt upon the most innovative features" of various
cooperative arrangements in the private sector. 5 Furthermore, said the
59. Hotel Employees Union, Local 737 v. Escambia County School Bd., 7 Fla. Pub.
Empl. Rep. (Labor Relations Press) 12,395, at 871 (1971), aff 'd., 426 So. 2d 1017
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983). But see Pinellas County Police Benevolent Ass'n v. Hillsborough
County Aviation Auth., 347 So. 2d 801 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977), and Hillsborough
County Aviation Auth. v. County Gov't Employees Ass'n, 482 So. 2d 505 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1986).
60. Hotel Employees Union, Local 737 v. Escambia County School Bd., 426 So. 2d
1017, 1019 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1018-19.
63. BUREAU OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AND COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS,
U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, U.S. LABOR LAW AND THE FUTURE OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT
COOPERATION 11 (BLMR 104, 1986).
64. 444 U.S. 672 (1980).
65. U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, supra note 63, at 14.
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report, "employees will hardly be encouraged to participate in cooperative
efforts with management if doing so will result in their exclusion from
the bargaining unit.""
The question is raised as to what extent states have applied Yeshiva
to public sector employers. Most states which have considered the
question have rejected the Yeshiva outcome. Relatively new laws, such
as in Illinois 7 and Ohio," expressly provide for faculty coverage at state
universities. State labor agencies generally have interpreted state laws
to include faculty as protected under those laws, such as in Alaska,O
California," Kansas, 7' and Oregon. 2 Only one case was located which
followed Yeshiva."3 Thus it appears that most states recognize that an
overbroad definition of managerial employee would operate to deprive
employees of collective bargaining rights or would tend to inhibit em-
ployees from extensive participation in the operation of the enterprise.
E. Other Areas
Many other areas were investigated and reviewed, but were found
not to constitute legal impediments to labor-management cooperation.
For example, many kinds of impasse resolution procedures are available
in different 9tates. About eleven states allow a limited right to strike,
while the remaining states prohibit strikes;7 ' about twenty states provide
for final and binding interest arbitration for at least some types of
employees to resolve disputes over the terms of new collective bargaining
agreements, 75 and many others provide for non-binding fact-finding. There
was no evidence, however, that any of these laws would impede labor-
management cooperation among parties willing to enter into cooperative
arrangements.
66. Id. at 15.
67. ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 48, 1701-1721 (Smith-Hurd 1986).
68. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.01(f)(3) & (k) (Baldwin 1987).
69. University of Ala. v. Associated Faculty Univ. of Ala., No. UA-80-2 (Ala. Lab.
Rel. Bd. 1981).
70. State of California Decision of the Public Employment Relations Board, 932
Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 44 (Oct. 5, 1981).
71. Kansas Higher Educ. Ass'n v. Wichita St. Univ., No. 75-UD-1-1980 (Kan. Pub.
Empl. Rel. Bd. 1981).
72. Southern Or. St. Col. v. Association of Profs., No. C-176-82 (Empl. Rel. Bd. Or.
1985).
73. This was a hearing officer's report in Univ. of Pitt., No. PERA-R-84-53 W (Pa.
Lab. Rel. Bd. 1987).
74. The status of strikes is thoroughly discussed in County Sanitation Dist. v. Los
Angeles County Employees Ass'n, Local 660, 38 Cal. 3d 564, 699 P.2d 835, 214 Cal.
Rptr. 424, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 995 (1985).
75. The states are set forth in Anderson, Presenting an Interest Arbitration Case: An
Arbitrator's View, 1986 Rep. of the Comm. on State & Local Gov't, ABA Sec. Lab. &
Empl. L., app. B.
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In the area of union security, the same is true. Various states allow
the union shop (five states), maintenance of membership agreements
(seven states), and agency shop or fair share arrangements (at least
seventeen states); about twenty-one states have adopted "right-to-work"
laws which prohibit the negotiation of union security clauses. 6 None of
the above-described arrangements seems to legally impede labor-man-
agement cooperation programs as described in Part I, and in fact such
programs do exist in states having each type of arrangement.
Generally, there are no serious legal obstacles to allowing represen-
tatives to participate in labor-management cooperation programs on
official time. In fact, contracts commonly provide, "Union representatives
will be in pay status for all time spent in labor-management meetings
which are held during their regularly scheduled hours of employment,""
or "employees shall suffer no loss of regular pay or benefits as a result
of participation in committee activities.""8
There was also no instance discovered where a governmental body,
by participating in a labor-management cooperation program, was found
to have engaged in an unlawful bypass of the exclusive representative.
Moreover, there was no evidence that the remedies for unfair labor
practices, or the lack thereof, had any relationship to the creation or
maintenance of labor-management programs. In one case, it was found
that a union's participation on a labor-management committee "did not
evince acceptance of the Authority's unilateral changes through waiver
by inaction," and Management was ordered to rescind the changes.79 In
another case, the employer unilaterally imposed a no-smoking rule with-
out first submitting the issue to a labor-management safety committee;
the arbitrator found a violation and ordered that the issue be submitted
to the safety committee?. In both of these instances the remedy seems
adequate to deal with the violation.
Finally, there was no evidence that state laws unduly restrict infor-
mation so as to impede labor-management programs. Generally, infor-
mation is much more available in the public sector than in the private
sector. Governmental budgets, accounts, books, et cetera are open doc-
uments. Many states have express and wide-ranging open-record laws.
In addition, most collective bargaining laws include a duty to provide
76. Descriptions of the basic types of union security arrangements, as well as the
states which have adopted them, are set forth in H. EDWARDS, R. CLARK, JR. & C.
CRAVER, LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 471-531 (3d ed. 1985).
77. Agreement Between State of Iowa and AFSCME, 22 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep.
(BNA) 369, 384 (Feb. 20, 1984).
78. Agreement Between State of Connecticut and Health Care Employees, 22 Gov't
Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 1116, 1136 (June 4, 1984).
79. Amalgamated Transit Union v. Orange-Seminole-Osceola Transit Authority, 11
Fla. Pub. Empl. Rel. Comm'n 16,241, No. CA-85-022, 85U-209 (1985).
80. H-N Advertising & Display Co., 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 329 (1986) (Heekin, Arb.).
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information necessary for collective bargaining8 and contract
administration.8
2
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
State and local governments, as well as unions representing govern-
mental employees, have become increasingly active in establishing labor-
management cooperation programs. National organizations representing
these groups also cooperate at the national level to encourage these
developments. The reasons for adopting or encouraging labor-manage-
ment cooperation programs are diverse, but they include cost savings,
improved quality of service, improved productivity, improved conditions
of work, greater utilization of employee education and talents, and
greater work satisfaction. Labor relations agencies can play an important
role in encouraging cooperation, especially when specific funding is
provided for this purpose.
Despite the many successes, there are some legal impediments to the
creation and development of labor-management programs in state and
local government. One such impediment, present in just under one-half
of the states, is the lack of a comprehensive labor relations law which
establishes a right to collective bargaining. Most of the reported labor-
management cooperation programs exist in states which have established
such a law. Such a law seems to be a prerequisite for the creation of
a climate in which mutual cooperation and respect, essential for the
success of such programs, will thrive.
Some states impede labor-management cooperation by excessively
limiting the scope of collective bargaining. Some impede mutual co-
operation by allowing unilateral civil service systems to unnecessarily
restrict collective bargaining efforts. Other states, more consistently with
cooperative efforts, apply a broader scope of bargaining and enforce
collective bargaining laws and agreements over conflicting civil service
regulations.
Most states have wisely rejected the rationale of the United States
Supreme Court in the Yeshiva decision, which applied an overbroad
definition of managerial employee so as to exclude college faculty from
organizational and bargaining rights. Adoption of Yeshiva by the states
would either inhibit extensive employee participation in government, or
would deprive employees of collective bargaining rights. Moreover, many
other laws which are unique to the public sector, from impasse resolution
procedures to information availability, do not constitute legal impedi-
ments to labor-management cooperation.
81. E.g., City of Hartford v. Local 760, Int'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters, 24 Gov't Empl.
Rel. Rep. (BNA) 780 (1986).
82. E.g., Michigan St. Univ. v. Clerical-Technical Union of Mich. St. Univ., 24 Gov't
Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 1286 (1986).
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